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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintifffAppellee,
v.
JAMES PATRICK IVIE,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

PETITION FOR REHEARING
CaseNo.970656CA

)
)
)

Priority Two
(Defendant Not Incarcerated)

Brent A. Gold, attorney for James Patrick Ivie, hereby respectfully submits this
Petition for Rehearing pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
INTRODUCTION
Ivie was arrested for DUI by Utah Highway Patrol Officer Marx after Marx
confronted Ivie at a Circle K parking lot for a license plat problem (R. 434-423).
The defense acknowledged Ivie had been drinking beer, but asserted that his
companion Kristin had driven to the parking space and had the keys; and that when
Marx confronted Ivie the motor was not running and the vehicle had not moved. (R.
614, 612, 610, 609, 608, 596, 579, 576, 575, 573, 569, 567; Opening Brief, p. 6-9).
A negative relationship going back to a fist fight in junior high between Marx and Ivie
was offered as a motive for Marx's fabrication of the charge. (R. 582-581).
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Over Ivie's objection, the trial court received part of Marx's DUI report as an
exhibit pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) under the theory it was a prior
statement of Marx's that was consistent with his in-court testimony. (R. 545-530).
The exhibit contained Marx's version of Ivie's post-arrest interview, including
explicit and implicit admissions of driving. It also contained Marx's statement of his
observation that the "vehicle was running and began to move." (Exhibit 9 is included
with the trial exhibits at R. 118 and reproduced in the Opening Brief Addendum).
The report was used extensively throughout the trial (e.g. line-by-line reading on
state's direct examination of Marx, R. 415-412; state's cross-examination of Ivie R.
566-563; state's case in rebuttal, R. 545; receipt of exhibit and repeat of line-by-line
reading, R. 529-524; state's re-direct of Marx in rebuttal, R. 514-513; state's further
rebuttal, R. 508-507).

The exhibit was also referred to several times in the

prosecutor's closing argument (R. 500, 499, 493, 491 & 477) and taken by the jury
into their deliberations (R. 474 & 464).
Appeal was taken on issues involving Utah Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B),
803(5) and 403. A Memorandum Decision filed December 10, 1998, found harmless
error under Rule 803(5), not reaching a decision under 801(d)(1)(B) and 403.
(Addendum A).

A motion and stipulation was filed for enlargement of time until

January 15, 1999 to file this petition.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Ivie agrees the court properly ruled that receiving the DUI report as an exhibit
violated Rule 803(5), but believes the court did not apply proper analysis in finding
2

harmless error.

The standard the court used to determine harmless error was not

appropriate to this case. Additionally, the court did not apprehended the importance
of the improperly admitted report as the centerpiece of the state's case and the court
overlooked the facts that the exhibit was emphasized with multiple references in the
prosecutor's closing argument and taken into the jury room as a concise one-sided
version of the evidence. Ivie also believes the court did not give due consideration to
the weaknesses of the states supporting witnesses.
By failing to address the pre-motive requirement of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and the
abuse of the trial court's discretion under Rule 403, the court leaves the door open for
continued improper bolstering of witnesses through police reports and other written
synopses of in-court testimony that are provided to the jury during deliberations.
ARGUMENT
A.

The court's decision reflects a misapplication of the
standard for determining harmless error and overlooks
the particular circumstances of the error in this case.

Page two of the Memorandum Decision of this court sets forth a barrage of
touchstones for determining harmless error: "...no reasonable likelihood exists that
the error affected the outcome..."; ".. .there is convincing properly admitted evidence
of all essential elements..."; "...whether the jury would have convicted the defendant
even without admission of the report..."; " sufficient evidence and eyewitness
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testimony to convict ...";"... erroneously admitted evidence was cumulative of other
testimony."
In the midst of this barrage, the court adopts the principle that "[W]hether a
new trial is warranted in this case depends on whether the result in the case would
have been more favorable to the defendant if the report had been excluded; that is,
whether the jury would have convicted defendant even without admission of the
report." (Mem. Dec, p.2). This is not the appropriate test for this case.
The normal standard for reviewing the harmfulness of evidentiary errors is
whether there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant in
the absence of such error. (Opening Brief, p. 3, citing State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2nd
388, 407 (Utah 1989); and State v. Lenaburg, 781 P.2nd 432, 436-437 (Utah 1989).
Also see State v. Stefaniak, 900 P. 2d 1094 (Utah App. 1995) where a different panel
of this court applied Rimmasch to find prejudicial error in admitting evidence on
witness credibility.)
This standard was not applied by the court. Requiring that the result "would
have been more favorable" does not include the quantifying parameter of "a
reasonable likelihood" of a more favorable result. In fact, it includes no parameters
at all. No level of certainty is provided for the court's conclusion that "exclusion of
the report would not have resulted in a more favorable outcome."
Making matters worse, the court appears to have actually decided the case
using a test in the form of a three stage finding that lacks logical continuity to support
a determination of harmless .
4

As best as Ivie can discern, the ruling of the court is based on findings that 1.)
there was "sufficient evidence to convict without the admission of the report;" 2.) "the
information contained in report was cumulative;" and that 3.) "Accordingly, because
exclusion of the report would not have resulted in a more favorable outcome for the
defendant and because the jury had already heard the contents of the report several
times, admission of the report, while error, was harmless." What's wrong with this
picture?
First, the initial finding of sufficient evidence (as well as the second and third
findings) do not reflect the proper inquiry because it does not consider the likelihood
of a more favorable result in the absence of error. No consideration is given to how
the exhibit bolstered the state's case and undermined the case of Ivie. (For example,
the state's use of the exhibit in closing argument to show Kristin was not driving that
night because the report does not say she made such a statement; that Ivie lied about
not driving because the report says he admitted driving; that the vehicle moved
because the report says it moved, etc.).
Second, the finding that the report was cumulative simply begs the issue of its
bolstering impact and its receipt in a form that allows the state's principal witnesses to
follow the jury into the jury room. The whole essence of the holding of harmful error
in cases such as Pendas-Martinez, Brown, Ware and Quinto, infra, is that cumulative
evidence in the form of a concise written statement of the government's case followed
the jury into their deliberations. Ivie's side of the case had no such benefit.
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Third, to the extent that findings 1 and 2 do reflect proper inquiry, the
combining of these findings do not logically result in the ultimate finding that
"exclusion of the report would not have resulted in a more favorable outcome for
defendant."

The process of determining if the exclusion of improper evidence

"would have been more favorable to the defendant" requires relative analysis of the
strength of the defendant's case; an inquiry into how the improper evidence bolstered
the state's side; consideration of how it undermined the side of the defendant, etc.
The court's Memorandum Decision does not reflect this process and does not
establish any parameters of certainty (reasonable likelihood) that the result would not
have been more favorable absent evidentiary error.

(For a general discussion of

determining if error warrants reversal, see State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, at 919 et seq.
(Utah 1987) and State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898, at 902 et seq. (Utah App. 1996).
Also see State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)cited on page 3 of Ivie's
Opening Brief for the abuse of discretion standard of review.)
State v. Thomas, 111 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah 1989) cited on page two of this
court's Memorandum Decision is not properly determinative in the instant case.
Thomas dealt with oral testimony.

Neither Thomas nor any of the other harmless

error cases cited in the court's Memorandum Decision involve the type of written
exhibit in the instant case that constitutes a concise statement of the state's evidence
on the only contested element of the offence and followed the jury into the jury room
after repeated requests that it be read during their deliberations.
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Pendas-Martinez, Ware, Brown and Quinto and Peterson, infra, illustrate the
particular analysis the court should have given to determining the prejudicial impact
of the error in the instant case:
1. the prosecutor made repeated reference to the exhibit in closing arguments
and urged the jury to read it during their deliberations; and
2.

the exhibit followed the jury into the jury room as a concise statement
establishing the only contested element needed to convict.

No consideration was given to these circumstances in this court's decision.
B.

The court's decision does not analyze the harmful impact
of the improperly admitted exhibit following the jury into
the jury room as a concise statement of the state's case
against Ivie.

Before trial, and throughout the proceedings, the central issue in this case
focused on whether Ivie had operated the vehicle.

(Opening Brief, p. 32-33).

Although a relatively close result at .092 (Exhibit 2 at R. 118), the alcohol test was
not seriously contested. (Opening Brief, p. 25, citing R. 490, In. 23-25).
The court's Memorandum Decision filed December 10, 1998, fails to consider
the fact that the improperly admitted exhibit followed the jury into their deliberations
as a concise presentation of evidence on the only seriously contested element of the
case. None of the cases cited by the court deal with the prejudicial impact of having
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such an improper and damaging exhibit in the jury's hands during their determination
of the case.
"[S]ince police reports of factual events and details of a criminal case are
generally made for the purpose of successfully prosecuting a crime, the reasons which
might otherwise provide a basis to assume reliability of such reports as business
records do not exist where police reports are offered by the prosecution in criminal
proceeding." State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1983).

Ivie requested this

court take note of this aspect of the DUI report, and also consider the cases cited on
pages 28-29 of Ivie's Opening Brief: United States v. Pendas-Martinez, 845 F.2nd 938
(11 th Cir. 1988); United States v. Brown, 451 F.2nd 1231 (5th Cir. 1971) and United
States v. Ware, 247 F.2nd 678 (7th Cir. 1957).
The court's Memorandum Decision overlooks any of the analysis provided by
these cases for determining the harmfulness of error when an improperly received
exhibit such as in the instant case is taken into the jury room.

In line with these

cases, the court's attention is also invited to United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224 (2nd
Cir. 1978), citing , Ware, Brown, et al., and stating:
[T]he specificity with which the document relates the entire course of
the interview, the questions propounded by the interrogators and
Quinto's responses to those inquiries, leads us to believe that it would
indeed be the unusual juror who would be unimpressed and
uninfluenced by the memorandum ....
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

"[t]he jury thus had before it a neat condensation of the government's
whole case against the defendant. The government's witnesses in effect
accompanied the jury into the jury room. In these circumstances we
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cannot say that the error did not influence the jury, to the defendant's
detriment, or had but very slight effect." United States v. Ware, 247
F.2d 698, 700-01 (7th Cir. 1957); accord, United States v. Brown, 451
F.2d 1231, 1233-34 (5th Cir. 1971); Sanchez v. United States, 293 F.2d
260, 267-70 (8th Cir. 1961); see United States v. Frattini, 501 F.2d
1234, 1235-36 (2d Cir. 1974); see also United States v. Adams, supra,
385 F.2d at 550-51 (Friendly, J.). Moreover, the error is not rendered
harmless by the fact that IRS "agents had testified and were crossexamined on the same subjects.ff United States v. Adams, supra, 385
F.2d at 551 (interpreting Ware and Sanchez)', accord, United States v.
Ware, supra, 247 F.2d at 700-01; United States v. Brown, supra, 451
F.2d at 1234.
582 F. 2d 224, at 235-6. (Underlining added.)
The DUI report in the instant case contains all of the arresting officer's version
of his post arrest interview, plus the officer's comments that the vehicle was running
and began to move. The exhibit was a "neat condensation" of the case against Ivie
on the only contested element of the offence.

The court should have analyzed this

point and granted a new trial.
C.

The court's decision overlooks the emphasis placed on the
exhibit by prosecutor during closing arguments.

The prosecutor emphasized the DUI Report to the jury no less than five times
during closing argument.

This included references to show the vehicle move, that

Ivie had admitted driving and that Kristin's testimony about telling Marx she was
driving that night could not have been true because it was not included in the report.
In four of these instances the prosecutor explicitly or implicitly told the jury to review
the report during their deliberations.

This was presented in pages 24-25 and 27 of
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Appellant's Opening Brief with trial transcript excerpts and references (R. 500, 499,
493, 491 & 477-6).
Pages 26 and 27 of Appellant's Opening Brief cites Peterson v. State, 1AA P.2d
1259 (Nev. 1987).

The Nevada court in Peterson reversed the conviction, placing

weight on the fact that reemphasizing improperly admitted evidence during closing
argument magnifies the prejudicial effect.
This court's decision overlooks the magnifying impact of prejudice when
improperly admitted evidence is reemphasized in closing arguments.
D.

The court's decision reflects a misapprehension of the
prominent roll the exhibit played in the state's case.

The interview section of the report was given a line-by-line reading in the
state's case in principle (R. 415-412) and used to cross-examine Ivie (R. 566-563).
After the trial court's ruling to receive the interview section of the report, the
prosecutor successfully urged the judge to include Marx's comments on the back page
report because it "...shows the motor was running, which is an important part of the
case." (R. 538)
The report was rehashed again almost line-for-line after its receipt as an exhibit
(R. 529-524),

It was also used to support the state's contention the "vehicle was

running and began to move"; to support Marx's version of the post arrest interview
and that of Ivie; and to discredit defense testimony by the absence of any reference in
the report to the fact that Ivie's companion Kristin was driving that night (R. 514-13,
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508-507; Opening Brief, p. 24; and Reply Brief, p. 20). The prosecutor couldn't wait
to get it in the jury's hands at the end of the state's case in rebuttal (R. 513)
As noted in Point B above and with transcript excerpt in pages 24-25 of Ivie's
Opening Brief, the prosecutor also used the report at least five times during his jury
summation and urged the jury to read the exhibit.
Ivie respectfully submits that this court's characterization of the exhibit as
merely "cumulative" misapprehends the prominent roll played by the DUI report in
the state's case.
E.

The court overlooked the weaknesses in the state's
witnesses supporting the arresting officer.

The court's Memorandum Decision notes there was testimony from three
officers. Marx's ride-a-long friend, Purdy, was an officer at the time of trial, but not
at the time of Ivie's arrest. Officer Isaccson was taking a break with Marx and Purdy
at the Circle K and did the vehicle impound. Ivie believes this court misapprehended
the relative importance of Purdy and Isaccson vis-a-vis the roll of the DUI report
exhibit; and the court overlooked Pages 30-32 of Ivie's Opening Brief highlights parts
of record relevant to the credibility of these two witnesses. (R. 697, 690, 689, 688,
684, 681, 680, 679, 678, 645, 643-640).
In a nutshell, Isaccson and Purdy were excluded from the courtroom while not
testifying and they remembered almost nothing surrounding the arrest except for the
brief window of time reflected in Marx's comments on the back page of the DUI
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report.

Isaccson never made a report, but read Marx's report before preliminary

hearing. (R. 695, 692 & 691).

Purdy wrote a statement several months later (after

Marx had made comments to him about the case). (R. 651, 648-646). (And compare
Purdy's testimony he saw exhaust coming from the license plate area (R. 652) with
the testimony of Ivie (R. 566) and Kristin Rogers (R. 601) that the exhaust exits on
the side between the front and rear tiers.)
F.

The court's decision does not consider the length of the jury's
deliberations.

Page 29 of Ivie's Opening Brief cites State v. Barker, 797 P.2nd 452, at 455
(Utah App. 1990) as authority for considering the length of jury deliberations in
analyzing the possibility of a more favorable result in the absence of error.
Deliberations in this case lasted over two and a half hours. (R. 460). This unusually
long time for a DUI case is emphasized by the fact that the only element the jury
needed to resolve was whether Ivie had driven the vehicle.
The length of deliberations in this case, weaknesses in the testimony of Purdy
and Isaccson and the bolstering impact of the DUI report strongly support the
likelihood of a more favorable result if the state had not been allowed to submit and
argue the DUI report and the jury had not had the use of the report during their
deliberations.
G.

The court should have clarified Utah law under Rule
801(d)(1)(B) and common law impeachment rehabilitation.
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Ivie submits that Utah Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) embodies a requirement
that statements used to rehabilitate a charge of improper motive must have been made
prior to the existence of the motive. This rule has century old roots in Utah law and
has recently been confirmed as the federal standard. Silva v. Pickard, 10 Utah 78, 37
P. 86 (1894); State v. Carrington, 15 Utah 480, 50 P. 526 (1897); and Tome v. United
States, 513 U.S. 150, 130 L. Ed. 2nd 574, 115 S.Ct. 696 (1995). (Opening Brief, Point
1, pages 13-17; Reply Brief, Point IB, pages 7-17).
The state claims there is no pre-motive requirement (Brief of Appellee, Point
IB, p. 16-24) and cites State v. Sibert, 310 P. 2d 388 (Utah 1957), State v. Asay, 631
P. 2d. 861 (Utah 1981), et al.

Ivie disagrees with this assertion and distinguishes the

cases relied on by the state. (Reply Brief, Point IB, p. 7-17).
Both parties agree that no reported Utah case after the adoption of Rule
801(d)(1)(B) has directly addressed the issue.
The court's failure to rule on this important point fosters uncertainty at the trial
level as to the pre-motive requirements for impeachment rehabilitation under either
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) or a common law rule that might circumvent 801(d)(l)((B) if
rehabilitation testimony or exhibits are not received as substantive evidence.
H.

By overlooking the trial court's abuse of discretion under
Rule 403, the court's decision effectively sanctions a
departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings.
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This case involved a particularly egregious example of allowing the state to
improperly bolster its witnesses. (Opening Brief, Point III, pages 20-23; Reply Brief,
Point B 1, pages 8-9).

This court's failure to address the trial court's abuse of

discretion in receiving the DUI report as an exhibit sends a permissive message that
similar bolstering scenarios can be allowed with the assurance the error will be
deemed harmless.
CONCLUSION
This court applied an inappropriate standard for determining harmless error
and overlooked the critical roll the improperly admitted exhibit played in the state's
case.
The court's failure to thoroughly address the issues in this case sets a stage for
chaos in the trial court.

Although the court's December 10, 1998 Memorandum

Decision is not for official publication, the impact is ultimately the same as a
published pronouncement: permissiveness at the appellate level redefines the accepted
the usual course of proceedings in the courts below. The tactical scenario for future
trials? Both parties prepare a written statement of their version of the facts; wait for
the other side to challenge their testimony; then introduce the prepared statement as
exhibit to accompany the jury during their deliberations. Those with a proclivity for
fabrication are particularly well rewarded.

The more egregious the lie, the more

likely its receipt as a written exhibit to rehabilitate the same version of oral testimony.
The jury in this case was out for over two and a half hours. The alcohol test
was not seriously challenged.

The only element in need of resolution was whether
14

Ivie was driving or in actual physical control. The presentation of Ivie's case ended in
the courtroom; but the state's case followed the jury into their deliberations on the
heals of the prosecutor's requests that Marx's report be read to prove the vehicle
moved, that Ivie had admitted driving and that Kristin had never told Marx she was
driving that night.

We do not know the details of the jury's deliberations or how

many votes might have been taken, but we do know that Marx's report was there until
the end. (R. 474-464).
Ivie was not afforded a level field of play and respectfully requests the court to
reconsider the prejudicial use of the DUI report, apply the appropriate standard and
considerations for determining harmful error and grant a new trial.
Dated this 15th day of January, 1999.

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH
Brent A. Gold, attorney for Petitioner James Patrick Ivie, hereby certifies the
foregoing Petition for Rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay.
Dated this 15th day of January, 1999.

BRK^AVGOLDW1213
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on this 15th day of January, 1999, I caused two true and correct
copies of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief to be mailed by first class U.S. mail with
sufficient pre-paid postage to counsel for Appellee, Laura B. Dupaix, Assistant Attorney
General, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854.
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ADDENDUM

FILED
DEC 1 0 1998
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS

ooOoo
State of Utah,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 971656-CA

James Patrick Ivie,
Defendant and Appellant.

F I L E D
(December 10, 1998)

Eighth District, Roosevelt Department
Honorable A. Lynn Payne
Attorneys:

Brent A. Gold and Raymond S. Shuey, Park City, for
Appellant
Jan Graham and Laura B. Dupaix, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee

Before Judges Davis, Billings, and Greenwood.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendant, James Patrick Ivie, appeals his conviction of
driving under the influence of alcohol, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 1998). We affirm.
Defendant argues that, under Utah Rule of Evidence 803(5),
the court should have excluded the DUI Report (the report) made
on the night of his arrest. While trial courts are generally
accorded broad discretion in making evidentiary rulings, see
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994), a trial court's
application of a particular rule of evidence is subject to a
correction of error standard. See Corbett v. Seamonsr 904 P.2d
229, 232 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Because defendant challenges the
trial court's application of Rule 803(5) in admitting the report,
we review the trial court's evidentiary ruling for correctness.
At trial, Officer Marx read from his report to refresh his
recollection of defendant's exact answers to the interview
questions asked on the night of the arrest. Although a
memorandum used to refresh a witness's recollection may be read
into evidence, it "may not itself be received as an exhibit
unless offered by an adverse party." Utah R. Evid. 803(5)

error did not prejudice defendant, we deny defendant's request
for a new trial and affirm his conviction.

£?£****

7-

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

WE CONCUR:

dith^M-^illings, Judged ~^7

971656-CA
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that, on the 10th day of December, 1998, a true and correct
copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION was deposited in the United States
mail to:
BRENT A. GOLD
RAYMOND S. SHUEY
312 MAIN ST
P 0 BOX 1994
PARK CITY UT 84060
and a true and correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION was
hand-delivered to a personal representative of the Attorney General's
Office to be delivered to:
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
LAURA B DUPAIX
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
and a true and correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION was
deposited in the United States mail to the judge listed below:
HONORABLE A. LYNN PAYNE
EIGHTH DISTRICT, ROOSEVELT
255 S STATE
PO BOX 12 86
ROOSEVELT UT 84 066

Judicial Secretary/

/J

TRIAL COURT: EIGHTH DISTRICT, ROOSEVELT, 965000091
APPEALS CASE NO.: 971656-CA

